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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study is to confirm empirically the implications of the theory 
about the law-finance-growth nexus. In order to verify the predictions of the 
theory, a panel data including three different types of data is used. All the data 
are referred to Italian provinces. The empirical analysis shows that between 
firms’ growth and financial development there is a first-order relationship, 
while between firms’ growth and legal enforcement as measured by the 
efficiency of the judicial system there is a second-order relationship. 
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FINANCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TO FIRM GROWTH: THE CASE 
OF ITALY 
 
by Domenico Sarno∗ 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Differences between long-run growth rates are theoretically explained with the 
degree of the development of financial markets and institutions. Although 
there is not agreement about the causal direction exiting between the financial 
development and the economic growth, there is a massive body of theoretical 
and empirical studies showing that the growth is strongly connected with the 
financial development through a first order relationship. Particularly, both the 
ideas that financial development accelerates economic growth and that the 
degree of maturity of financial markets represents a good predictor of the 
potential of economic growth are largely accepted. This is because the financial 
institutions gathering the information mitigate the problems that arise from the 
information asymmetries and reduce the transaction costs, mobilize the private 
savings and improve the allocation efficiency (King, Levine, 1993; Levine, 
1997). 
An related field of analysis has been growing recently; it aims to identify the 
causes of the differences between national financial structures. Within this 
approach differences between national legal systems are explained with 
reference of the major legal traditions: the British Common Law and the 
French Civil Law (La Porta et al., 1997,1998; Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic, 
1998, 1999). According to this theory, the countries have developed over the 
years legal systems insuring the protection of the private rights in different 
degrees. This protection is higher in the  Common Law tradition compared to 
the Civil Law tradition. “The British Common law evolved to protect private 
property owners against the crown. This facilitated the ability of private 
property owners to transact confidently, with positive repercussions on 
financial development. In contrast, the French Civil law was constructed to 
eliminate the role of a corrupt judiciary, solidify state power, and restrain the 
courts from interfering with state policy. Over time, state dominance produced 
a legal tradition that focuses more on the rights of the state and less on the 
rights of individual investors than the British Common law.” (Beck et al., 2003, 
pp.138-139). 
However, beyond differences in origin, the protection of the investor rights also 
depends on law enforcement. The level of the enforcement can vary within the 
same legal systems. It is determined by the efficiency of the judicial system 
and its performance can significantly differ within the same national legal 
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system because of the misallocation of resources or local imbalances between 
the judicial demand and supply. 
The rules protecting creditor interests and contractual enforcement affect more 
directly the efficiency of the financial markets and thus have repercussion on 
the growth. The finance theory helps us to explain the microeconomics of this 
process more precisely. The default probability is reflected by agency costs; 
the larger the degree of opacity in the relationship between the firm and the 
financial markets, the higher the agency costs. Those costs rise more if there 
is a lack of enforcement; as a consequence the access to external financing 
sources becomes more difficult and credit rationing and request for collaterals 
are increasing. Therefore, the firm will be able to take market opportunities to 
grow only if it can produce internal resource flows devoted to finance it. That 
makes financial constraints more likely; economic growth, therefore, becomes 
more volatile due to this higher dependence of firm growth on internal finance. 
In this work I propose a preliminary analysis of this theoretical field through a 
intra-country analysis utilising a microeconomic data set. More precisely, the 
paper aims to verify empirically the existence of a first-order relationship  
between firm growth and financial development and of a second order 
relationship between firm growth and judicial efficiency. The data set consists 
of a closed sample of Italian SMEs and a number of variables measuring  
financial development and judicial efficiency in Italian provinces. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I discuss the theoretical 
foundations of the law-finance-growth relationship. Section 3 presents the 
characteristics of the data set. In section 4 an preliminary, graphical analysis is 
proposed, while in section 5 I illustrate the empirical model and the estimates 
obtained. Some concluding remarks are reported in the last section. 
  
 
2. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL SYSTEM AND FIRM GROWTH: A 
BRIEF REVIEW 
 
 
The finance theory allows us to understand how market imperfections restrict 
the possibility for the firm to use the external resources in order to finance its 
investment projects. According to this theory, market imperfections feed the 
conflict between the firm’s insiders and the outsider investors; this conflict 
originates from, on the one hand, information asymmetries and, on the other 
hand, the lack of the contractual enforcement. 
Information asymmetries make it impossible or too costly to sign complete 
contracts between lenders and borrowers; inefficient enforcement makes 
default profitable. The size of this negative effects is determined by the 
degree of the development of the financial and legal systems: they are the 
less extensive the more developed are financial and legal institutions [Beck et 
al. 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998, 2000; Levine, 1998, 1999]. 
Growth theory has definitively rejected the idea that the financial systems 
adjust to real growth passively; instead, the financial systems are seen as 
determinant to the process of economic growth. The main function of financial 
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institutions and markets is to mitigate the problems arising from  information 
imperfections. Particularly, the financial institutions are dedicated to gathering 
information; this makes the ex-ante acquisition of information cheaper and 
makes the ex post monitoring of the firm’s behaviour more efficient. The 
delegated monitoring function minimizes transaction costs and improves 
resource allocation; moreover, it affects capital accumulation,  technological 
innovation and long-run growth dynamic [Diamond, 1984; Bernanke, Gertler, 
1990; Levine 1997]1. 
Financial institutions play an important role in reducing the opacity in the 
relationship between firms and financial markets and in facilitating firms’ 
access to external finance. Of course, it is not easy to empirically verify how 
much well behaved financial institutions resolve the problems deriving from the 
information imperfections; nevertheless, the analysis using microeconomic 
data set help us to evaluate their importance. On this regard the theory 
suggests that, if the costs related to acquisition of the information by the 
outsider investors increase, the difficulties for the firm to get access of external 
resources increase as well. Empirical works show that the firms receive more 
external funding where financial markets are more developed [for example, 
Beck et al., 2005]. 
Information imperfections increase the wedge between the external and the 
internal finance; this makes internal resources cheaper  as primary financial 
source of funding. As a consequence, the growth of the firm is more strictly 
dependent on the internal resources that the firm can produce and can devote 
to finance itself2,3. 
The literature on the financial constraints to the growth of the firm draws on 
these theoretical discussions. There is now a wide body of research in this 
field, producing many important but controversial results. This literature is 
heavily focused on the problem of the relationship between capital structure 
and the growth of the firm. The theoretical basis are the Modigliani-Miller 
propositions that establish the independence of the growth of the firm from 
capital structure and, on the opposite side, the pecking order hypothesis 
affirming that external finance is not a perfect substitute for internal funding 
and, consequently, the growth is not independent from the internal finance4. 
                                                 
1 The large literature on the finance-growth nexus dates back to the paper by Gurley-Show, 
Goldsmith and McKinnon. The recent research is reviewed by Levine (1997). 
 
2 Information imperfections cause the credit rationing. Collaterals exist to reduce the effects of 
the credit rationing. On the one hand, this permits to supply credit to small opaque firms; on 
the other hand, it is a device that allows to control managers’ behaviour. 
 
3It is believed that the relationship banking can reduce the negative impact of information 
imperfections. Close relationships between firms and banks facilitate the information transfer 
and improve the relationship of the firms with the financial markets. Nevertheless, the 
empirical results are contrasted. On the one hand, relationship banking gives benefits with 
regard to the decreasing interest rate and increasing credit availability. On the other hand, it 
may carry high private and social costs arise as banks exploit market power deriving from its 
information advantage. 
   
4 The two propositions of MM are contained in the 1958’ and 1961’ articles [Modigliani, Miller, 
1958, 1961] and have been subsequently extended by Miller [Miller, 1977]; the pecking order 
hypothesis dates back to the works of Myers and Majluf [Myers, Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984]. 
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Empirical studies have tried to identify a positive relationship between firm’s 
growth and internal finance. In particular, there have been questions as to 
whether the sensitivity of investments to cash flow is a good indicator of the 
presence of financial constraints to growth [Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond, Meghir, 
1994;  Hubbard, 1998]5,6. 
The sources of agency conflicts lie in  the capital structure of the firm. The 
property right theory helps us to identify this sources. According to this theory, 
different funding sources are associated with different kinds of contracts 
defining the allocation of property rights. Those contracts minimize the 
transaction costs and simultaneously act in protection of investor’s interests. 
For example, an equity issuance causes an ex ante reallocation of shares of the 
property rights within the firm; here investor’s protection lies in the owners’ 
behaviour. By contrast, in the case of debt issuance this protection is ensured 
through an ex post transfer of property rights to the firm’s assets; the creditor 
can recover totally or partially his credit if the firm defaults [Williamson, 1985, 
1988; Aghion, Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995]. 
Within this framework the problems arise when the mechanism of the transfer 
of the property rights on firm’s assets cannot adequately protect creditor’s 
interests when the firm acts to reduce the value of the transferred assets7.  
Therefore, the function of the judicial system in the lender/borrower 
relationship is to force the repayment of debt upon the borrower who would 
not do it spontaneously. Indeed, the borrower could find non-repayment 
profitable when the benefits of the default exceeds the perceived costs of the 
penalty. Since the weakness of the enforcement reduces the credibility of the 
threat and the costs related to it, the inefficiency of the judicial system tends 
to increase the opportunistic behaviour of the borrowers. As a consequence, 
lenders discount the probability of such event by reducing credit supply and 
making firm’s access to the external finance more difficult. 
This argument is proposed by Jappelli et al. (2005). In this work trough a 
theoretical model the authors show that judicial inefficiency increases 
incentives for borrowers to behave in an opportunistic way with no relation 
whatsoever to the probability of a successful outcome for investment projects. 
This happens because the borrower can always deny the repayment of its debt 
to the lender leading it to a trial. The advantages of default for the borrower 
increase if: a) the borrower can appropriate of a part of the income arising 
from the investment or can consume part of the collateral; b) the cost of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
5 The references cited in the text are representative of a massive body of theoretical and 
empirical studies analysing the problems related to the relationship between the capital 
structure and the growth of the firm and about to investment financing; the cited work of 
Hubbard (1997) contains a broad review of this literature. 
 
6 The thesis that the sensitivity of investment on cash flow can be interpreted as financial 
constraints has been famously put into question by Kaplan and Zingales [Kaplan, Zingales, 
1997, 2000]. They believe that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow indicates profitable 
opportunities by the firm. 
 
7 In the finance theory those strategies are seen as costly because they decrease the firm 
value. 
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trial is sustained entirely by the lender. Within the model the hypothesis about 
agents’ behaviour is developed assuming that the credit markets are 
competitive or, alternatively, imperfect; the conclusions of this research 
suggest that the improvement of the enforcement reducing the opportunistic 
behaviour leads to an increase of the credit supply (or a decrease of credit 
rationing) and a decrease of the collaterals8.  
  
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA SET 
 
The analysis covers the 103 Italian provinces and the years from 1995 to 2003 
years. The data set collects three different types of data: microeconomic data 
on firms, data related both to financial development and to the efficiency of 
the judicial system. 
The microeconomic data on firms comes from a closed sample of Italian 
manufacturing SMEs. This sample has been extracted from the last three 
surveys on the Italian Manufacturing Sector performed by Capitalia, and 
previously by Mediocredito Centrale, for the three three-years 1995-1997, 
1998-2000 and 2001-20039. It is composed of 533  small and medium sized 
firms (<250 employees); the small firms (<50 employees) represent 89,1% of 
the sample (475 firms). A size variables is determined on sample’s data: 1) 
total assets (ASSET) of the firms. 
The data on the financial system come from Bank of Italy statistics. They 
consist of: a) the number of the bank branches by province; b) the distribution 
of the loans granted to residents by province. In order to define the variables 
used  for the estimate data from ISTAT source on population and GDP by 
province are in addition utilised. The model then uses two proxies for financial 
development : (2) the number of bank branches for 100,000 inhabitants 
(BRANCHS_POP) and (3) the loans/GDP ratio (LOANS_GDP) by province. 
The data related to judicial system are obtained from the ISTAT statistics of 
the civil justice. Those statistics include the annual flow of trials and the stock 
of pending trials; moreover the statistics contain several measures of efficiency 
of the legal system. Since 2000 this data is broken down at the court district 
level, corresponding to provinces or below; for previous years the data are 
available at the level of appeal’s court districts, which encompass one or more 
provinces10. The data by province are obtained by matching of the court data 
and appeal’s court data and provinces. Two proxies of the efficiency of civil 
judicial system are defined: 4) the ratio of closed trials on total trials 
                                                 
8 The effects on the interest rates are ambiguous because they are affected by the market 
structure. In a monopolistic market the lender can appropriate of the borrower surplus 
entirely; therefore, an improvement in the judicial efficiency causes an increase in interest 
rates. In competitive markets, the rate rises if there is inside collateral, while if there is outside 
collateral the effect on the rates is ambiguous. 
 
9 The “Survey of Italian manufacturing firms” draws on a representative sample of the 
population of manufacturing firms; it is based on questionnaires filled by the sampled firms 
and of the data sheet for the most of them. 
 
10 There are 164 court districts and 26 appeals court districts. 
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(CLOSEDTRIALS) and 5) the mean length of trials (LENGHTRIALS); the first 
one is an efficiency index, the second one an inefficiency measure. 
Finally, the data set used for the estimate has been obtained by matching of 
the firm-level data and the values of financial and judicial variables of the 
province where the firm has its headquarters 11. 
 
 
4. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ITALIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
  
 
With regard to the empirical analysis it is decisive to consider the efficiency of 
the judicial system. There is much empirical work devoted to this issues 
(Marchesi, 1998, 2001, 2003; ISTAT-MIPA, 2006).  The national judicial 
statistics contains standard efficiency indicators related to the trials at various 
judiciary levels. However the subject is very complex. 
Generally civil contentious can be classified into four classes: property and 
obligations, succession, work and family. The procedures are divided into three 
classes of trials: cognitive, precautionary and executive. The cognitive trial is 
finalised to the assessment of the judicial controversy while the other two 
classes of trials precede or following to it12. The efficiency analysis can be 
restricted to the cognitive trials. They concern all the different degrees of 
justice and they are concentrated in the courts13. Statistics are available for all 
the various degrees; they relate to the ingoing and outgoing trials and the 
stock of pending trials; moreover there are several indicators scaled to 
population and efficiency indexes14,15. 
The trend of two efficiency indexes is taken here as an example. The graphs in 
the FIGURE 1 depicts the trend in the years 1996-2006 of 1a) the number of 
the I° and II° degree trials pending both at first-degree courts and at the 
courts of the appeals scaled for the population (100,000 inhabitants) and 1b) 
                                                 
11 The sample contains firms belonging to 92 of the 103 Italian provinces. 
 
12 More precisely, the precautionary trial precedes and complements the cognitive trial because 
it should guarantee the successful of the cognitive and executive trials. By contrast, the 
executive trial makes the execution of the sentence and therefore follows the cognitive trial. 
 
13 Since 1998 a significant reorganization of the Italian judicial system has been implemented. 
The court has become the only one judicial office for the I° degree trials. The less important 
trials in civil law are delegated to “peace officer”. Therefore the three different degree of the 
civil justice are: the peace officer or the court, the court of appeals and, finally, the Cassation 
court.  
 
14 The efficiency indexes available from national statistics are: the turnover ratio, the closed 
trials ratio, the index of controversial settlement and the mean length of the trials. A more 
exhaustive definition of the indexes used in this work is provided in APPENDIX 1. 
 
15 Cognitive trial concern the general contentious of the civil justice. Marchesi (2003) finds that 
in years 1975-1998 about the 60% of annual cognitive trials involved economic controversies. 
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the mean length of the trials16. The trend of the pending trials shows a weak 
improvement of the efficiency, in particular since 1999. The mean length of 
trials is significantly decreasing. In both of the cases, the improvement have 
almost exclusively concerned I° degree trials. 
FIGURE 2 reports the territorial differences in the two previous efficiency 
indexes of the judicial system. The graphs show the distribution of the 
residuals with regard to the national mean of 2a) the pending trials and 2b) 
the length of the trials of the judicial district and of appeal’s courts17. Since the 
graphs reflects the regional distribution of the judicial districts from the 
Northern to Southern Italian regions moving towards right, it appears clearly 
that the judicial activities in the northern judicial districts are more efficient 
than in Southern judicial districts.  
Before presenting the estimates, it can be useful at this stage of the analysis 
to verify through an descriptive, graphical analysis the relationship between 
the development of the financial system and the efficiency of the judicial 
system.  
In FIGURE 3 the two pairs of graph represent the relationships between the 
two proxies of the financial development by province and the two proxies of 
the judicial efficiency by province. The data express the mean of the period 
and then are transformed into index numbers around a national mean value 
(=100). The graphs include trend lines as well. 
The pair of graphs 3a) and 3b) shows an increasing relationship between the 
two financial indicators and the rate of closed trials; the other pair, 3c) and 
3d), shows an decreasing relationship between the two financial variables and 
the mean length of trials. 
In all cases, it appears clearly that there is a relevant positive relationship 
between enforcement as measured by the efficiency of the judicial system and 
the development of the financial markets. 
 
 
5. FINANCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS TO FIRM GROWTH: THE 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
The previous model can be represented by two equations: in the first, the 
growth of the firm is dependent by the financial development; in the next, the 
financial development is dependent by the judicial efficiency. 
                                                 
16Both our indicators may suffer from measurement error: the indexes are based on the data 
regarding cognitive trials, which include many disputes on matter other than credit. Jappelli et 
al. (2005) shows high correlation between the ISTAT data and Bank of Italy data, in a survey 
on credit recovery costs and procedures (both judicial and non judicial) in the presence of 
insolvent borrowers. The survey includes 269 banks, representing 90 per cent of total loans. 
The characteristics and the main findings of this survey are presented in Generale and Gobbi 
(1996). 
 
17 As we have mentioned above, there are 26 court of appeal’s districts; moreover, there are 3 
judicial sections that are not included in the graphs. The districts are in accordance with the 
judicial demand: they are fewer in the Northern and Central regions of Italy, while they are 
more numerous in the South and in the Islands. 
 
 9 
Therefore, the panel representing the reduced form of the model can be 
represented as 
 
                        log Yi,t = β1 log Yi,t-1 + β2 Fit + β3 Git + αi,t + ηi + εit 
 
where firm growth is log Yt-log Yt-1 and Y the size variable of the firms [assets 
(ASSET)], F represents the two variables measuring financial development 
[branch banks/population ratio (BRANCHS_POP) and loans/GDP ratio 
(LOANS_GDP)] and, finally, with G as the two proxies of the judicial efficiency 
[closed trials/total trials ratio (CLOSEDTRIALS) and mean length of the trials 
(LENGHTRIALS)];  α and  η  are the specific and temporal effects, ε  the error 
term. 
All the variables are expressed as natural logarithm; the statistics and the 
correlation matrix of those variables are presented in TABLE 1. 
The estimates are obtained through the DPD methodology proposed by 
Arellano-Bond (1994). It is known that in the Arellano-Bond estimate the first 
differences of the variables are used to eliminate the fixed effects; subsequent 
GMM estimates are performed using the independent lagged variables as 
instruments. The choice of the instruments is a crucial issue; it can be seen 
that, due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term, the more suitable instruments are the two lag independent 
variables18. 
The estimates are in TABLE 219. The Sargan tests reject the null hypothesis 
about the restrictions of over-identification, while the AR tests confirm the 
presence of the first-order correlation and reject the presence of second-order 
autocorrelation between the residuals; the test F is always significant. 
The estimates are coherent with the theory. The coefficient related to the 
lagged independent variable are about 0.50/0.60 values. The positive 
relationship between firm growth and the proxies of the financial development 
are confirmed: the BRANCHS_POP coefficients are higher (0.17/0.18) 
compared to the LOANS_GDP coefficients (0.05/0.07). The sign of the 
coefficients related to the judicial system are positive for the efficiency index 
(CLOSEDTRIALS) and negative for the inefficiency index (LENGHTRIALS); all 
the coefficient values are in the range 0.20/0.24. 
 
                                                 
18 The instruments are obtained using the orthogonal condition between the lagged dependent 
variable and the errors. In order to illustrate this approach a model AR(1) can be considered 
yit= ρ yit-1 + νit    where   νit=µi + εit 
where both µi and εit  are normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. In order 
to obtain an consistent estimator by ρ for fixed T (small) and N→∞ the first order differences 
are calculated and the fixed effects µi are eliminated. The result is 
∆yi = ρ∆yit-1 + ∆εit 
where yit-1 is correlated with εt-1. This means that if the observations begin in year t = 1, the 
first year where the previous relationship can be observed is t=3. 
 
19 We have produced estimates using the employees as dependent variable. This estimates 
confirms the casual relationship,  but they show serial correlation between instrument with 
two, three and four lags and error terms. This violates the conditions imposed in the PDD 
approach. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The results of the previous analysis confirm the implications of the theory 
about law-finance-growth nexus. This study differs with existing works on the 
same subject in two ways. First, the analysis presented here is not cross-
country but is, instead, performed within the same national context and 
focuses on cross-regional (provincial) differences in the contractual 
enforcement as measured by the efficiency variables of the civil justice. 
Secondly, microeconomic data, not macroeconomic data, is used for the 
empirical test. 
The econometric test has confirmed that there is a first order relationship 
between the degree of financial development and economic growth; at the 
same time, the test has shown that there is a positive relationship between the 
growth of the firm and the efficiency of the civil judicial system. 
This conclusions are in line with the basic tenets of the theory exposed above. 
The potential growth of firms is affected by financial development in that more 
developed financial markets improve the firm’s access to external funding 
sources. This enables firms to finance their investment projects using external 
finance, thus mitigating the financial constraints arising when economic growth 
is excessively sensitive to internal finance. Financial development is enhanced 
if the rule system devoted to protect the investor well-behaves. The 
lender/borrower contract is typically incomplete because it occurs in a 
environment where there are information imperfections; which frequently lead 
to opportunistic behaviours and defaults. The improvement of the enforcement 
can reduce the opportunistic behaviours if the legal system efficiently enforces 
the rules protecting the creditors’ interests and makes penalty credible in case 
of default. 
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APPENDIX 1 – DATA BY PROVINCE 
 
The data are referred to the 103 Italian provinces for the period 1995-2003. 
They are classified for three types: microeconomic data of the firms, data 
related to the financial system and data related to the judicial system (civil 
justice).  
 
FIRM’S MICROECONOMIC DATA – The data are available from a closed sample 
formed by 533 manufacturing firms. The sample is extracted from the last 
three surveys of the Italian manufacturing firms on three three-years periods: 
1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003. Source: Capitalia, Medio Credito Centrale 
 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM DATA – The data cover the distribution of the bank 
branches by province and the distribution of the loans to the residents by 
province. Source: Bank of Italy  
 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM DATA – The data refer to the trials requiring adjudication of 
substantive rights (cognitive trials). They concern a broad aggregate of all 
cases on civil matters, among which credit and commercial matters, which 
represents about 60% of the total trials. This data are available for court 
district since year 2000 and for appeal’s court district in previous years. 
Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
 
In order to determine the set of variables utilized for the estimates, the data of 
the GDP and of the Populations by province for the period 1995-2003 are 
considered. 
Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
 
The variables are: 
 
1) ASSET – Total assets extracted from the data sheet of the firms of the 
closed sample, 
2) BRANCHS_POP – Branch banks / Population  ratio (100,000 inhabitants)  
by provinces 
3) LOANS_GDP – Loans / GDP ratio by provinces 
4) CLOSEDTRIALS – Closed trials / Total Trials ratio.  
     The index is calculated as: 
              Closed Trials / (Initial Pending Trials + Occurring trials) 
 
5) LENGHTRIALS – Mean length of the trial (days).  
     The index is calculated as: 
 (Initial Pending Trials + Final Pending Trials) / (Occurring Trial + Closed 
Trials) x 365  
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LEGENDA OF JUDICIAL DISTRICTS 
 
1. TO Torino 
2. MI Milano 
3. BS Brescia 
4. TN Trento 
5. VE Venezia 
6. TS Trieste 
7. GE Genova 
8. BO Bologna 
9. FI Firenze 
10. PG Perugia 
11. AN Ancona 
12. RO Roma 
13. AQ L'Aquila 
14. AB Campobasso 
15. NA Napoli 
16. SA Salerno 
17. BA Bari 
18. LE Lecce 
19. PZ Potenza 
20. CZ Catanzaro 
21. RC Reggio di Calabria 
22. PA Palermo 
23. ME Messina 
24. CL Caltanissetta 
25. CT Catania 
26. CA Cagliari 
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FIGURE 1 -  STOCK OF PENDING TRIALS AND MEAN LENGHT OF TRIALS – ITALY 
 
The graphs depict a) PENDING TRIALS scaled for the population (100,000 inhabitants) opened in 
the courts and the appeal’s courts and b) MEAN LENGTH OF TRIALS (days) in the 1996-2004 years. 
Data are absolute value. 
Source: Processing on Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
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FIGURE 2 – STOCK OF PENDING TRIALS AND MEAN LENGHT OF TRIALS BY JUDICIAL 
DISTRICTS 
 
The graphs depict a) PENDING TRIALS scaled fOR the population (100,000 inhabitants) opened in 
the courts and the appeal’s courts and b) MEAN LENGTH OF TRIALS (days) in the 1996-2004 years 
by judicial districts. Data are expressed as residuals on the mean value. The list of the judicial 
districts is in APPENDIX 1. 
Source: Processing on Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
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FIGURA 4 – FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY RELATIONSHIP 
 
The graphs contain the provincial number index (Italy=100). On the y-axis there are the 
provincial number index of the financial development variables (BRANCHS_POP) (100,000 
inhabitants) and the LOANS / GDP ratio); on the x-axis there are the provincial number index 
of the judicial efficiency variables (CLOSEDTRIALS and LENGTH OF TRIALS).  
Source: processing on Bank of Italy and ISTAT data. 
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TABLE 1  – STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
In the table are reported the statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables used for the estimates. 
ASSET = Total assets at year t; ASSETS-1= Total asset at year  t-1; BRANCHS_POP = Branch banks / 
population ratio  by provinces (100,000 inhabitants); LOANS_GDP = Loans / GDP ratio by provinces; 
CLOSEDTRIALS = Closed trials / Total Trials ratio; LENGHTRIALS = Length of trials (days). 
 
 
 
ABSOLUTE VALUES 
Variable       Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
ASSET 33535 138924 366 2778020 
ASSET-1 31756 132775 328 2676513 
BRANCHS_POP 56,3 12,8 16 103 
LOANS_GDP 76,4 30,5 10 169 
CLOSEDTRIALS 31,2 6,6 13 58 
LENGHTRIALS 991,9 301,2 348 2492 
  
 
 
LOGARITHMIC VALUES 
Variable       Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
ASSET 9,165 1,291 5,904 14,837 
ASSET-1 9,114 1,284 5,793 14,801 
BRANCHS_POP 3,998 0,265 2,773 4,634 
LOANS_GDP 4,246 0,457 2,302 5,129 
CLOSEDTRIALS 3,416 0,217 2,565 4,061 
LENGHTRIALS 6,855 0,299 5,852 7,822 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 ASSET ASSET-1 BRANCHS_POP LOANS_GDP CLOSEDTRIALS LENGHTRIALS 
       
ASSET 1,000 0,992 0,052 0,104 0,049 -0,072 
ASSET-1 0,992 1,000 0,048 0,113 0,058 -0,082 
BRANCHS_POP 0,052 0,048 1,000 0,234 0,282 -0,368 
LOANS_GDP 0,104 0,113 0,234 1,000 0,237 -0,410 
CLOSEDTRIALS 0,049 0,058 0,282 0,237 1,000 -0,892 
LENGHTRIALS -0,072 -0,082 -0,368 -0,410 -0,892 1,000 
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TABLE 2 - LAW-FINANCE-GROWTH ESTIMATES 
 
This table contains the estimates of the relationship between the firm growth, the financial 
development and the judicial efficiency. The variables are expressed in natural logarithm. The 
dependent variables are: ASSET (Total asset); the dependent variables are ASSET-1 and 
BRANCHS_POP (branch / population ratio), LOANS_GDP (Loans on GDP ratio), CLOSEDTRIALS 
(Closed trials / Total trials ratio) and LENGHTRIALS (length of trials in days).  
Estimates: Arellano-Bond estimates  (GMM estimates on the first order differences and  
instruments yt-2 e yt-3); years 1995-2003. The standard deviation are in quadratic brackets; *, 
**, *** significance levels at  1, 5 and 10%.  
SARGAN = test of sovra-identification (critical value at 1% = 25.2); AR(1) and AR(2) – 
Arellano-Bond test (H0 = absence of autocorrelations of first order residuals and of second 
order residuals, respectively). 
 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT VARAIBLE: ASSET 
     
ASSET-1 .581 .536 .580 .514 
 [.031]*** [.033]*** [.031]*** [.036]*** 
BRANCHS_POP .187 .174   
 [.072]*** [.067]***   
LOAN_GDP   .074 .053 
   [.011]*** [.010]*** 
CLOSEDTRIALS .202  .245  
 [.040]***  [.033]***  
LENGHTRIALS  -.209  -.219 
  [.031]***  [.027]*** 
     
       
F TEST 952.4*** 1074.5*** 1001.4*** 1095.2*** 
SARGAN 300.6*** 300.4*** 324.9*** 350.4*** 
AR(1) -15.4*** -12.5*** -14.6*** -12.1*** 
AR(2) -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 
     
N°  INSTRUMENTS 84 84 84 84 
N° OBSERVATIONS 3720 3720 3730 3730 
 
 
